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Mind	Misreading	
Shannon	Spaulding		
Invited	contribution	to	Philosophical	Issues,	annual	supplement	to	Nous		
Abstract:		Most	people	think	of	themselves	as	pretty	good	at	understanding	others’	beliefs,	desires,	emotions,	and	intentions.	Accurate	mindreading	is	an	impressive	cognitive	feat,	and	for	this	reason	the	philosophical	literature	on	mindreading	has	focused	exclusively	on	explaining	such	successes.	However,	as	it	turns	out,	we	regularly	make	mindreading	mistakes.	Understanding	when	and	how	mind	misreading	occurs	is	crucial	for	a	complete	account	of	mindreading.	In	this	paper,	I	examine	the	conditions	under	which	mind	misreading	occurs.	I	argue	that	these	patterns	of	mind	misreading	shed	light	on	the	limits	of	mindreading,	reveal	new	perspectives	on	how	mindreading	works,	and	have	implications	for	social	epistemology.			
1.	Introduction		In	common	parlance,	mindreading	is	the	telepathic	ability	to	see	into	another	person’s	mind	and	discern	what	they	are	thinking.	Telepathic	mindreading	is	exotic	and	intriguing	–	at	least	judging	by	the	number	of	movies,	TV	shows,	and	novels	about	it	–	and	not	real.	In	philosophy	and	the	cognitive	sciences,	there	is	another	sense	of	mindreading	that	is	less	exotic	but	just	as	interesting.	This	kind	of	mindreading	is	the	ability	to	attribute	mental	states	to	agents	in	order	to	interpret	their	behavior	and	anticipate	what	they	will	do	next.	It	is	a	central,	ubiquitous	feature	of	our	social	lives.	When	we	are	driving	on	a	busy	freeway,	taking	care	of	our	children,	teaching,	fielding	questions	at	a	talk,	we	attribute	beliefs,	desires,	emotions,	and	other	mental	states	to	people	in	order	to	make	sense	of	their	behavior	and	interact	successfully	with	them.		
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The	social	world	is	incredibly	complex.	Our	unique	experiences,	physiological,	behavioral,	and	psychological	factors	influence	our	mental	states.	Moreover,	our	mental	states	are	dynamically	related	to	others’	mental	states.	What	we	think,	feel,	and	intend	depends	on	what	others	are	thinking,	feeling,	or	intending.	Figuring	out	why	another	person	behaved	as	she	did	and	anticipating	what	she	will	do	next	involves	grasping,	at	some	level,	how	all	of	these	factors	influence	her	mental	states.		The	dynamics	of	real-world	social	interactions	are	so	complex	that	it	is	amazing	that	we	accurately	mindread	at	all.	Mindreading	seems	to	come	very	easily	to	most	of	us.	We	often	have	little	difficulty	understanding	others’	mental	states.	We	generally	can	tell	what	other	drivers	are	trying	to	do	and	why,	what	our	child	wants	and	why,	when	our	students	are	bored	or	interested,	and	whether	the	audience	member	understands	our	answers.	Given	how	impressive	this	feat	is,	it	is	natural	to	frame	the	study	of	mindreading	around	the	cognitive	processes	that	make	successful	mindreading	possible.	Indeed,	this	has	been	focus	of	the	mindreading	literature	since	its	inception	in	the	late	1970s.		My	focus	here,	however,	will	be	on	mindreading	failures,	i.e.,	mind	
misreading.	Most	people	think	of	themselves	as	pretty	good	at	understanding	others’	beliefs,	desires,	emotions,	and	intentions.	However,	social	psychologists	have	discovered	that	we	are	significantly	worse	at	mindreading	than	we	think	we	are	(Ames	&	Kammrath,	2004;	Epley,	2008;	Hall,	Andrzejewski,	&	Yopchick,	2009;	Realo	et	al.,	2003).	We	consistently	and	substantially	overrate	our	ability	to	accurately	judge	others’	mental	states	and	interpret	social	interactions.	This	may	be	due	to	a	lack	of	interest	in	correcting	our	mindreading	mistakes,	a	lack	of	feedback	on	errors,	
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or	an	extreme	instance	of	the	Dunning-Kruger	effect.1	Whatever	the	cause,	the	consensus	from	the	empirical	literature	is	that	mind	misreading	is	very	common.		The	philosophical	literature	on	mindreading	does	not	study	mind	misreading	in	any	systematic	way.2	This	is	unfortunate	because	there	is	a	high	theoretical	payoff	for	examining	our	mindreading	errors.	Specifically,	patterns	of	mind	misreading	shed	light	on	our	various	mindreading	strategies	and	the	conditions	under	which	we	use	(and	misuse)	these	strategies.	In	this	way,	the	investigation	of	mind	misreading	reveals	the	limits	of	our	mindreading	abilities,	which	are	not	apparent	when	one	focuses	solely	on	successful	mindreading.	In	addition,	the	examination	of	mind	misreading	suggests	novel	hypotheses	about	how	we	understand	others	that	are	not	evident	simply	from	studying	mindreading	successes.		In	this	paper,	I	explore	this	divergence	between	our	subjective	sense	of	our	mindreading	abilities	and	the	objective	evaluation	of	our	mindreading	abilities.	In	the	next	Section,	I	briefly	review	the	two	main	accounts	of	mindreading.	In	Section	3,	I	discuss	the	empirical	literature	on	the	varieties	of	mind	misreading.	I	consider	the	distinctive	errors	that	arise	for	accuracy-oriented	mindreading	and	efficiency-oriented	mindreading.	In	Section	4,	I	discuss	the	implications	of	mind	misreading.	I	argue	that	these	patterns	of	mind	misreading	indicate	specific	limits	on	our																																																									1	The	Dunning-Kruger	effect	is	a	cognitive	bias	wherein	poor	performers	in	social	and	intellectual	domains	are	unaware	of	their	ignorance	(Kruger	&	Dunning,	1999).	Their	deficiency	is	invisible	to	them	perhaps	because	recognizing	their	deficiency	requires	the	very	competency	they	lack.	2	This	literature	extensively	discusses	mindreading	failures	in	chimpanzees	and	children	in	the	context	of	establishing	a	phylogenetic	and	ontogenetic	timeline	for	mature	mindreading.	It	also	examines	the	mindreading	failures	of	individuals	with	autism.	However,	there	is	no	systematic	discussion	of	neurotypical	adults’	mindreading	errors,	which	is	what	I	focus	on	here.		
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mindreading	abilities.	Furthermore,	I	argue	that	these	patterns	of	mind	misreading	suggest	that	self-reflection	plays	an	important	factor	in	mindreading	accuracy.	In	Section	5,	I	discuss	the	implications	for	social	epistemology.	
	
2.	Theories	of	Mindreading		Two	competing	accounts	have	dominated	the	mindreading	literature:	the	Theory	Theory	(TT)	and	the	Simulation	Theory	(ST).	The	TT	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	behavior	by	employing	a	tacit	folk	psychological	theory	about	how	mental	states	inform	behavior.	With	our	folk	psychological	theory,	we	infer	from	a	target’s	behavior	what	his	or	her	mental	states	probably	are.	From	these	inferences,	plus	the	psychological	principles	in	the	theory	connecting	mental	states	to	behavior,	we	predict	the	target’s	behavior.		On	this	view,	interpreting	a	person’s	behavior	and	anticipating	what	they	will	do	next	fundamentally	is	the	same	as	explaining	and	predicting	the	position	of	the	electrons	in	a	cloud	chamber.	In	both	cases,	we	rely	on	a	rich	body	of	domain-specific	information	about	the	target,	which	we	use	to	infer	causal	states,	and	on	the	basis	of	this	we	make	predictions	about	the	behavior	of	the	target.	Our	theory	of	mind	is	tacit	and	less	formalized	than	our	scientific	theories,	but,	it	is	argued,	the	ability	to	understand	others	is	best	understood	as	the	application	of	a	theory.	The	ST,	in	contrast,	holds	that	we	explain	and	predict	a	target’s	behavior	by	using	our	own	minds	as	a	simulation	of	the	other	person’s	mind.	To	explain	a	target’s	behavior,	we	put	ourselves	in	another’s	shoes,	so	to	speak,	and	imagine	
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what	our	mental	states	would	be	and	how	we	would	behave	if	we	were	that	agent	in	that	particular	situation.	To	predict	a	target’s	behavior,	we	take	the	attributed	mental	states	as	input	and	simulate	the	target’s	decision	about	what	to	do	next.	Simulation	theorists	reject	the	idea	that	mindreading	consists	in	theorizing.	According	to	ST,	we	do	not	require	a	large	body	of	folk	psychological	information	about	how	mental	states	inform	behavior	in	order	to	mindread.	On	this	view,	all	we	need	is	the	ability	to	imagine	oneself	in	a	different	situation,	figure	out	what	one	would	think,	feel,	and	do	in	that	situation,	and	attribute	those	imagined	mental	states	to	another	person.	This	simply	requires	us	to	use	our	ordinary	cognitive	mechanisms	in	an	offline	way	for	the	purpose	of	mindreading.	Thus,	the	ST	is	regarded	as	an	information-poor	theory,	whereas	the	TT	is	regarded	as	an	information-rich	theory.		In	addition	to	what	we	might	call	pure	TT	and	pure	ST	are	hybrid	accounts	that	incorporate	elements	of	TT	and	ST.		These	hybrid	accounts	aim	to	capture	the	theoretical	advantages	of	ST	and	TT	while	avoiding	the	problems	with	both	theories.	Shaun	Nichols	and	Stephen	Stich	(2003)	have	developed	a	TT-centric	hybrid	account,	and	Alvin	Goldman	(2006)	has	developed	a	ST-centric	hybrid	account.	These	two	innovative	accounts	have	served	as	pillars	for	the	mindreading	literature.		
3.	Mind	Misreading		Studying	both	successful	and	unsuccessful	processes	is	a	common	methodology	in	philosophy	and	the	cognitive	sciences.	Consider,	for	example,	the	study	of	vision,	
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memory,	and	self-knowledge.	In	each	of	these	cases,	researchers	study	how	the	capacity	works	and	how	it	breaks	down.	To	learn	how	vision	works,	we	study	veridical	perception	but	also	misperception,	visual	hallucinations,	and	visual	illusions.	Memory	researchers	study	how	and	when	we	have	accurate	memories,	but	this	is	paired	with	investigation	of	false	memories,	misremembering,	and	amnesia.	Similarly,	research	on	self-knowledge	covers	successful	introspection,	confabulation,	and	self-deception.	These	three	cases	are	representative	of	the	study	of	cognition	in	general.	The	underlying	rationale	is	that	to	understand	a	process,	you	must	understand	when	and	how	it	fails.		The	debate	between	the	TT,	the	ST,	and	various	hybrid	accounts	primarily	focuses	on	explaining	successful	mindreading.	Though	it	is	important	to	study	successful	mindreading,	for	several	reasons	this	discussion	should	be	paired	with	an	examination	of	mind	misreading.	First,	as	noted	in	the	introduction,	we	are	not	nearly	as	good	at	mindreading	as	we	think	we	are.	Focusing	purely	on	successful	mindreading	presents	a	misleading	picture	of	our	actual	abilities.	Second,	patterns	of	mind	misreading	reveal	the	limits	of	our	mindreading	abilities	that	are	not	apparent	when	focusing	solely	on	successful	mindreading.	Third,	an	examination	of	mind	misreading	suggests	a	novel	perspective	on	what	it	takes	to	mindread	successfully.	In	this	Section,	I	shall	examine	several	prevalent	but	underexplored	errors	that	arise	for	two	types	of	mindreading.	In	the	philosophical	literature	on	mindreading,	many	theories	tacitly	assume	that	the	primary	aim	of	mindreading	is	accuracy.	That	is,	when	we	attribute	mental	states	to	others	in	order	to	interpret	
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and	anticipate	their	behavior,	the	most	important	goal	is	to	attribute	the	correct	mental	states.	Although	this	certainly	is	true	in	some	cases,	accuracy	is	not	always	the	primary	concern	in	mindreading.	Sometimes	we	are	not	motivated	to	or	simply	cannot	engage	in	a	thorough	deliberation	about	a	target’s	mental	states,	and	in	these	cases	efficiency	trumps	accuracy.	When	efficiency	is	the	primary	goal	in	mindreading,	we	use	various	mindreading	heuristics,	which	are	cognitively	less	demanding	and	reliable	when	used	appropriately.		In	discussing	the	varieties	of	mind	misreading,	I	shall	distinguish	between	the	errors	that	arise	for	accuracy-oriented	mindreading	and	the	errors	that	arise	for	efficiency-oriented	mindreading.	This	is	not	a	hard	and	fast	distinction.	Some	processes	will	not	fit	cleanly	into	the	accuracy-seeking	or	efficiency-seeking	categories.	Some	efficient	strategies	may	play	a	role	in	deliberative	mindreading,	and	deliberative	processes	may	influence	efficient	strategies.	Despite	these	complications,	the	distinction	between	efficiency-oriented	and	accuracy-oriented	mindreading	is	helpful	in	this	context,	and	I	will	use	it	to	illustrate	the	types	of	mind	misreading.3			
3.1	Mind	Misreading:	Aiming	for	Accuracy	
																																																									3	I	distinguish	between	deliberative	and	efficient	mindreading	processes,	but	I	remain	neutral	on	the	kind	of	cognitive	system	that	underlies	these	processes.	It	could	be	that	there	are	two	separate	systems	–	system	1	and	system	2	–	that	realize	each	type	of	process.	Alternatively,	there	may	be	one	system	that	realizes	all	mindreading	processes	but	is	modulated	by	executive	function	or	some	other	factor.	There	may	be	other	options,	as	well.	My	arguments	are	neutral	with	respect	to	these	different	hypotheses.	
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In	some	social	interactions,	our	primary	aim	is	accurate	mindreading.	This	usually	occurs	when	something	important	depends	on	getting	it	right,	when	it	matters	to	us	personally,	when	we	will	be	held	responsible	for	our	interpretation	of	the	interaction,	or	when	the	situation	is	unusual	or	unexpected	(Fiske	&	Neuberg,	1990;	Kelley,	1973;	Tetlock,	1992).	When	our	primary	aim	is	accuracy,	we	tend	to	search	for	relevant	information	in	a	controlled	and	deliberative	fashion.	Consider,	for	example,	what	it	is	like	to	go	on	a	first	date.	You	are	trying	to	figure	out	whether	the	person	is	interested	in	you	romantically,	shares	your	beliefs	and	values,	has	a	good	personality,	will	not	cheat,	wants	to	be	in	a	long-term	relationship,	etc.	The	stakes	are	relatively	high	for	you;	you	do	not	want	to	invest	time,	energy,	and	emotion	in	someone	who	will	turn	out	to	be	a	poor	match	for	you.	Thus,	you	will	want	to	consider	all	the	relevant	evidence	and	make	sure	your	judgments	are	not	based	on	merely	superficial	cues.		When	we	aim	for	accurate	mindreading,	errors	can	occur	under	three	conditions:	when	we	are	under	cognitive	load	and	thus	cannot	engage	in	a	thorough	search	for	information;	when	we	apply	an	inappropriate	model	to	the	situation;	when	our	information	search	is	skewed	by	other	motivations.		Table	1:	Types	of	mindreading	errors	for	accuracy-oriented	mindreading.			
Accuracy-
oriented	
Mindreading	
Types	of	Mind	Misreading	
	Deliberation	 Cognitive	load	interferes	with	information	search	 Apply	the	wrong	model	 Self-interest	biases	information	search		
	 9	
	The	first	sort	of	error	that	arises	for	deliberative	mindreading	occurs	when	one	lacks	the	cognitive	resources	to	engage	in	a	thorough,	objective	information	search.	Deliberative	mindreading	is	effortful	and	cognitively	taxing,	and	it	is	difficult	if	one	is	under	cognitive	load	or	not	well	practiced	in	this	kind	of	reflective	reasoning	(Gilbert,	Krull,	&	Pelham,	1988).	In	such	cases,	the	result	is	that	our	social	inferences	are	biased	toward	the	most	readily	accessible	information,	which	may	lead	to	error.		Consider	again	the	first	date	example.	Suppose	that	the	evening	you	go	on	the	date,	you	are	tired,	stressed	about	work,	and	distracted	during	the	date.	A	thorough,	objective	deliberation	about	your	date	is	doubly	difficult	for	you:	Not	only	must	you	try	to	make	a	good	impression	on	your	date	by	being	personable	and	witty,	you	also	must	listen	to	and	interpret	what	your	date	is	telling	you,	figure	out	what	food	choice,	clothes,	questions	and	answers	tell	you	about	your	date’s	mindset,	and	you	must	do	all	this	while	physiologically	and	cognitively	taxed.	A	careful,	deliberative	information	search	requires	going	beyond	just	the	salient	cues.	However,	you	are	too	cognitively	taxed	to	do	this	with	much	care,	and	as	a	result	your	deliberation	is	guided	by	superficial	but	potentially	misleading	cues.		So,	what	are	the	salient	cues	in	social	interactions?	For	all	of	us,	the	most	salient	features	of	a	person	tend	to	be	their	age,	race,	and	gender	(Ito,	Thompson,	&	Cacioppo,	2004;	Liu,	Harris,	&	Kanwisher,	2002).	We	rapidly	sort	people	by	age,	race,	and	gender	and	other	social	categories,	depending	on	the	content.	On	the	basis	of	this	categorization,	we	spontaneously	attribute	personality	traits	such	as	
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trustworthiness,	competence,	aggressiveness,	and	dominance	(Olivola	&	Todorov,	2010;	Rule,	Ambady,	&	Adams	Jr,	2009).	Although	the	speed	of	spontaneous	trait	inferences	is	a	matter	of	dispute,	it	occurs	very	rapidly:	between	100	milliseconds	and	1400	to	1600	milliseconds,	even	when	we	are	under	cognitive	load	(Malle	&	Holbrook,	2012;	Todorov	&	Uleman,	2003).		In	addition,	we	spontaneously	and	implicitly	associate	these	social	categories	with	specific	characteristics.	For	example,	we	associate	old	and	incompetent,	female	and	warm,	baby-face	and	unthreatening.	These	associations	are	the	sort	of	thing	tested	by	the	Implicit	Association	Task,	which	measure	the	strength	of	a	person’s	implicit	associations	(Greenwald,	McGhee,	&	Schwartz,	1998;	Greenwald,	Poehlman,	Uhlmann,	&	Banaji,	2009).		Putting	all	of	this	together,	in	ordinary	social	interactions	the	most	accessible	information	about	another	person	tends	to	be	an	individual’s	social	category,	spontaneously	inferred	personality	traits,	and	implicit	associations.	It	is	possible	in	deliberation	to	override	the	implicit	associations	and	spontaneously	inferred	traits	if	one	is	motivated	and	has	the	cognitive	resources	to	do	so.	However,	if	one	is	busy,	stressed,	and	tired,	overriding	these	inferences	and	associations	is	extremely	difficult,	and	they	may	bias	one’s	deliberation.	Thus,	it	is	difficult	for	you	on	your	hypothetical	first	date	to	deliberate	objectively	about	whether	your	date	is	committed	to	being	in	a	serious	relationship,	shares	your	values,	is	loyal,	etc.	Your	deliberation	is	influenced	by	implicit	associations	and	trait	inferences,	which	under	ideal	circumstances	you	would	reflect	on	and	possibly	reject.	However,	because	you	are	under	cognitive	load	you	lack	the	ability	to	override	these	salient	features	in	
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favor	of	less	salient	but	potentially	more	accurate	features.	Thus,	errors	arise	for	deliberative	mindreading	when	we	are	cognitively	taxed	and	cannot	deliberate	carefully.		The	second	kind	of	error	that	may	occur	when	we	are	aiming	for	accurate	mindreading	concerns	the	framework	we	employ	to	make	sense	of	a	social	interaction.	Even	in	good	deliberative	mindreading,	we	do	not	consider	all	of	the	available	information.	That	would	be	impossible	because	there	is	far	too	much	information	for	human	beings	to	process.	Instead,	we	search	for	the	most	relevant	information	and	base	mindreading	judgments	on	that	information.4	The	situational	context	and	one’s	past	experiences	determine	what	is	taken	to	be	relevant	information.	They	shape	expectations	in	social	interactions,	and	they	make	certain	interpretations	more	accessible	to	us,	i.e.,	our	attention	is	primed	for	these	interpretations	(Wittenbrink,	Judd,	&	Park,	2001).			Consider	the	following	simple	example.	Having	spent	much	of	my	life	on	university	campuses,	I	generally	know	what	to	expect	when	I	visit	a	university	campus,	even	one	that	is	unfamiliar	to	me.	I	understand	the	general	institutional	structure,	social	roles,	and	typical	behavior	of	administrators,	faculty,	and	students.	I	have	a	model	that	guides	my	interpretation	and	expectations	of	what	happens	on	campuses.	Someone	who	has	never	attended	a	university	and	has	no	experience	with	life	on	a	university	campus	may	not	have	the	same	interpretations	and	expectations	as	I	do.	They	will	use	a	different,	less	appropriate	framework	to																																																									4	Some	errors	occur	because	the	information	we	attend	to	includes	statistical	outliers	or	our	information	sample	is	small	and/or	biased.	These	statistical	errors	are	common	to	every	type	of	reasoning,	so	I	will	not	devote	special	attention	to	them	in	discussing	mind	misreading.	
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understand	and	anticipate	behavior	they	encounter	on	a	university	campus	and	thus	are	likely	to	misunderstand	some	of	the	idiosyncratic	behaviors	on	university	campuses.	The	theory-ladenness	of	social	observation	is	key	to	the	second	type	of	error	in	deliberative	mindreading.	We	are	likely	to	attend	to	irrelevant	or	misleading	information	when	the	framework	that	guides	our	information	search	is	faulty	in	some	respect.	If,	for	example,	the	framework	does	not	apply	to	the	situation,	or	if	the	framework	itself	inaccurate,	then	we	are	likely	to	misinterpret	others’	behavior.	Consider	again	my	model	for	university	campuses.	It	is	useful	and	appropriate	for	most	American	and	European	universities,	but	despite	some	superficial	similarities	it	is	not	appropriate	for	contemporary	technology	campuses	like	Googleplex	or	Microsoft	Campus.	If	I	apply	my	university	model	to	Googleplex,	I	am	likely	to	misunderstand	the	institutional	and	social	dynamics,	and	I	am	likely	to	misunderstand	the	behavior	and	motivations	of	people	in	this	environment.		In	general,	applying	an	inappropriate	or	faulty	model	to	a	situation	can	lead	us	to	misinterpret	social	interactions,	which	paves	the	way	for	mind	misreading.	This	is	especially	likely	to	happen	when	we	are	under	cognitive	load	because	we	may	fail	to	notice	that	our	model	does	not	fit	the	situation.	This	kind	of	error	also	is	likely	to	occur	when	we	are	overly	confident	in	our	social	interpretation,	which	is	common	when	a	situation	seems	very	familiar	to	us.	In	such	cases,	because	we	are	confident	we	understand	the	social	dynamics,	we	do	not	reflect	on	our	interpretation	or	consider	the	possibility	that	we	are	employing	an	inappropriate	or	faulty	model	of	the	social	interaction.		
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A	third	sort	of	error	in	accuracy-oriented	mindreading	arises	when	the	mindreading	process	is	skewed	by	self-interest.	In	many	social	interactions,	our	social	interpretations	are	shaped	by	the	need	for	anxiety	reduction,	self-esteem	preservation,	and	confirmation	of	one’s	worldview.	In	these	cases,	our	mindreading	inferences,	in	one	way	or	another,	serve	self-interested	purposes	(Dunning,	1999;	Kunda,	1990).	These	motivations	lead	to	several	specific	mindreading	errors.	Consider	first	the	Self-Serving	Attributional	Bias,	which	describes	our	tendency	to	take	credit	for	success	and	deny	responsibility	for	failure.	(Miller	&	Ross,	1975).	We	often	attribute	our	successes	to	some	internal	factor,	e.g.,	diligence	or	talent,	and	attribute	our	failures	to	external	mitigating	factors,	e.g.,	bad	luck	or	bias.	In	this	way,	we	come	to	feel	good	about	our	successes	and	brush	off	our	failures.		This	pattern	is	found	for	judging	in-group	and	out-group	behaviors,	as	well.	This	is	called	the	Group-Serving	Attributional	Bias	(Brewer	&	Brown,	1998;	Pettigrew,	1979).	One	tends	to	judge	the	success	of	an	out-group	to	be	the	result	of	external,	mitigating	situational	factors	and	the	failure	of	an	out-group	as	the	result	of	internal	factors,	whereas	one	judges	the	success	of	one’s	in-group	to	be	the	result	of	internal	factors	and	the	failure	of	one’s	in-group	to	be	the	result	of	situational	factors.	One	sees	this	pattern	of	reasoning	very	clearly	in	sports	fans.	When	the	Badgers	win	it	is	because	they	are	talented	and	hard	working,	but	when	the	Badgers	lose	it	is	because	they	were	off	their	game	that	day,	the	other	team	got	lucky	a	few	times,	and	the	referees	were	biased	against	the	Badgers.	The	Self-	and	Group-Serving	Attributional	Biases	tend	to	occur	in	a	context	of	threat	or	competition.	In	such	contexts,	we	employ	different	types	of	explanations	
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depending	on	whose	behavior	we	are	explaining.	Whether	we	cite	situational	factors	or	mental	states	depends	on	our	perceived	similarity	to	the	target,	not	whether	situational	factors	or	mental	states	actually	caused	the	behavior.	Thus,	these	biases	distort	our	judgments	about	our	own	and	others’	behavior.	Naïve	Realism	is	another	sort	of	mind	misreading	generated	by	self-interest.	It	describes	the	tendency	to	regard	others	as	more	susceptible	to	bias	and	misperception	than	oneself	(Pronin,	Lin,	&	Ross,	2002).	We	think	that	we	simply	see	things	as	they	are	but	others	suffer	from	bias.	This	tendency	is	prevalent	in	interactions	in	which	people	disagree.	For	example,	one	regards	those	of	a	different	political	party	as	misguided	and	biased	by	their	personal	motivations,	whereas	one	regards	oneself	(and	to	some	extent	other	members	of	one’s	political	party)	simply	as	correct.	We	assume	that	we	simply	see	things	as	they	really	are.	Naïve	Realism	influences	the	mental	states	we	attribute	to	ourselves	and	to	others.	This	bias	is	entrenched	in	our	reasoning,	but	it	is	especially	common	when	we	are	overly	confident.	In	those	cases,	we	fail	to	consider	seriously	the	idea	that	we	are	the	ones	who	are	biased	and	misperceiving.	Finally,	confirmation	bias	describes	a	general	tendency	to	seek	only	information	that	confirms	one’s	preconceived	ideas	and	interpret	ambiguous	information	in	light	of	these	preconceived	ideas.	With	respect	to	social	cognition,	we	have	preconceived	ideas	about	other	individuals	and	groups,	and	we	tend	to	interpret	social	interactions	in	terms	of	those	preconceived	ideas.	For	example,	racists	notice	when	individuals	behave	in	ways	that	confirm	their	racist	beliefs	but	they	often	do	not	attend	to	the	many	cases	where	individuals	act	in	ways	that	
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disconfirm	their	racist	beliefs.	Confirmation	bias	occurs	regardless	of	how	the	preconceived	idea	originated,	how	likely	it	is	to	be	true,	and	whether	accuracy	is	incentivized	(Skov	&	Sherman,	1986;	Slowiaczek,	Klayman,	Sherman,	&	Skov,	1992;	Snyder,	Campbell,	&	Preston,	1982).	
	
3.2	Mind	Misreading:	Aiming	for	Efficiency	
	Section	3.1	explains	three	ways	in	which	thoughtful	deliberation	about	others’	mental	states	can	go	awry.	This	Section	explains	the	types	of	errors	in	efficient	mindreading.	Although	sometimes	our	primary	aim	is	accurate	mindreading,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	Often	there	are	constraints	on	our	motivation,	time,	and	attention	that	prohibit	even	attempting	to	engage	in	a	thorough	search	for	information.	In	such	cases,	accuracy	is	a	secondary	aim	and	efficiency	is	the	primary	aim.	When	the	social	interaction	seems	ordinary	and	familiar,	when	not	much	hangs	on	it,	or	when	we	are	otherwise	cognitively	taxed,	we	use	cognitive	shortcuts.	When	our	primary	goal	is	efficient	mindreading,	several	strategies	are	available.	The	strategies	we	use	depend	on	whether	or	not	the	individual	we	are	mindreading	is	part	of	our	in-group.	We	identify	people	as	part	of	our	in-group	or	part	of	an	out-group	on	the	basis	of	perceived	similarity	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b;	Ames,	Weber,	&	Zou,	2012).	That	is,	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	like	us	are	categorized	as	part	of	in	our	in-group,	and	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us	are	categorized	as	part	of	an	out-group.	One	tends	to	identify	people	who	share	one’s	age,	race,	gender,	religion,	or	nationality	as	part	of	one’s	in-group.	However,	because	people	have	
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multiple,	overlapping	identities,	and	perceived	similarity	is	relative	to	a	context,	social	categorization	extends	beyond	these	basic	classifications.	Thus,	I	may	consider	someone	as	part	of	my	in-group	in	one	context	but	not	in	another.5		First	consider	the	heuristics	we	use	when	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	similar	to	ourselves	in	some	salient	respect.	In	these	cases,	we	often	simply	project	our	own	mental	states	to	that	individual	(Ames,	2004a,	2004b;	Ames	et	al.,	2012).	This	is	an	efficient	strategy	because	we	do	not	have	to	deliberate	about	the	target’s	situation	and	likely	mental	states.	Rather,	we	simply	infer	that	the	target	believes,	desires,	or	feels	about	some	event	the	way	we	do.	For	example,	in	many	contexts	I	consider	philosophers	as	my	in-group.	I	have	learned	that	philosophers	tend	to	have	similar	social	and	political	views.	If	I	learn	that	Sally	is	a	philosopher,	I	assume	that	she	shares	many	characteristics	in	common	with	me,	including	political	opinions.	In	such	a	case,	I	simply	project	my	own	political	judgments	on	her	without	any	deliberation.		Sometimes	we	also	use	our	mental	states	as	an	anchor	and	adjust	the	interpretation	based	on	how	similar	the	individual	is	to	us.	For	example,	if	I	learn	that	Sally	specializes	in	social	and	political	philosophy,	I	may	think	that	she	probably	has	more	nuanced	views	on	politics	than	I	do	and	adjust	my	attributions	accordingly.	Projection	and	anchoring-plus-adjustment	are	egocentric	heuristics.	If	our	perceptions	of	similarity	are	correct,	and	if	we	accurately	introspect	our	own	mental	states,	these	egocentric	heuristics	are	useful	and	accurate.	Errors	occur	when	these	two	conditions	are	not	satisfied.																																																									5	Importantly,	perceived	similarity	is	a	subjective	and	sometimes	idiosyncratic	judgment,	not	an	objective	measure	of	actual	similarity	(Ames	et	al.,	2012).	
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Errors	arise	when	we	overestimate	the	similarity	between	ourselves	and	the	other	person(s)	and	thus	engage	in	more	projection	than	is	warranted.	The	resulting	errors	are	called	the	False	Consensus	Effect	and	the	Curse	of	Knowledge	(Clement	&	Krueger,	2002;	Epley	&	Waytz,	2010,	p.	512).	The	False	Consensus	Effect	occurs	when	we	falsely	assume	that	a	group	of	people	shares	our	perspective	on	some	issue.	The	Curse	of	Knowledge	is	a	related	phenomenon	in	which	we	falsely	assume	that	another	individual	knows	what	we	know.	For	both	kinds	of	mind	misreading,	we	inappropriately	project	our	own	mental	states	onto	others	because	we	assume	that	we	are	more	similar	than	we	in	fact	are.	The	specific	details	on	how	this	happens	will	differ	from	case	to	case.	In	general,	inappropriate	projection	occurs	when	we	attend	to	superficial	similarities	between	others	and	ourselves	and	fail	to	notice	or	appreciate	dissimilarities,	e.g.,	in	terms	of	situational	context,	personal	background,	knowledge,	attitudes,	and	emotions.		A	second	kind	of	error	for	egocentric	heuristics	occurs	when	we	correctly	diagnose	the	similarity	between	the	mindreading	target	and	ourselves	but	inaccurately	introspect	our	own	mental	states.	In	such	a	case,	projecting	our	own	mental	states	onto	a	target	is	warranted	because	we	are	similar	to	the	target	in	the	relevant	respect,	but	we	fail	to	understand	our	own	beliefs,	desires,	motivations,	and	feelings	and	thus	attribute	the	wrong	mental	states.	Consider,	for	example,	a	self-unaware	racist	who	thinks	of	himself	as	“color	blind”	but	in	fact	harbors	many	racist	attitudes.	In	mindreading	a	similar	person,	the	mindreader	correctly	judges	that	the	other	person	is	similar	and	thus	projects	his	own	attitudes	to	that	person.	In	this	case,	he	attributes	to	the	other	person	the	belief	that	all	races	are	equal.	However,	he	
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makes	a	mindreading	error	because	neither	he	nor	the	similar	other	actually	have	racial	egalitarian	attitudes.	If	he	had	introspected	correctly,	he	would	have	recognized	his	White	Supremacist	attitudes	and	projected	those	to	the	similar	other	person.	This	kind	of	error	is	likely	to	occur	when	we	are	less	self-reflective	and	thus	do	not	understand	our	own	mental	states.	The	previous	kinds	of	efficiency-oriented	mindreading	are	based	on	egocentric	heuristics,	which	we	employ	when	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	similar	to	us.	When	we	perceive	an	individual	to	be	different	from	us,	we	use	alternative	efficient	strategies,	namely,	stereotypes	about	the	individual’s	salient	in-group	(Ames,	2004a;	Ames	et	al.,	2012;	Krueger,	1998;	Vorauer,	Hunter,	Main,	&	Roy,	2000).	Stereotypes	may	be	positive,	negative,	or	neutral	beliefs	about	some	group.			Table	2:	Types	mindreading	errors	for	efficiency-oriented	mindreading.			
Efficiency-
oriented	
Mindreading		
Types	of	Mind	Misreading	
	Projection	 Overestimate	similarity;	inappropriately	project	one’s	mental	states	
Overestimate	similarity;	insufficiently	adjust	projection	
Correctly	judge	similarity;	incorrectly	introspect	one’s	mental	states	
Stereotyping	 Underestimate	similarity;	baselessly	apply	stereotype	
Employ	false	stereotype	 Employ	misleading,	unrepresentative	stereotype		 Stereotypes	are	reliable	heuristics	for	understanding	others’	behavior	when	they	are	applied	appropriately	and	the	stereotypes	are	accurate	and	representative.	We	may	make	mistakes	when	either	of	these	two	conditions	is	not	satisfied.	When	
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we	underestimate	the	similarity	between	ourselves	and	the	other	person,	we	baselessly	apply	stereotypes	where	projection	or	deliberative	mindreading	would	be	more	appropriate.		Contrary	to	what	one	might	expect,	we	are	likely	to	make	this	type	of	error	when	we	are	in	familiar	situations.	When	we	are	in	unusual	or	unfamiliar	situations,	we	tend	to	deliberate	about	the	interaction	more	than	we	do	in	normal	and	familiar	cases.	As	particular	situations	become	familiar	to	us,	certain	interpretations	of	those	situations	will	become	more	accessible,	more	routinized,	and	increasingly	difficult	to	override	(Higgins,	King,	&	Mavin,	1982).	Thus,	in	very	familiar	situations	we	may	fail	to	notice	or	appreciate	stereotype-inconsistent	behavior	and	thus	inappropriately	apply	stereotypes.	A	second	type	of	error	for	stereotype-based	mindreading	occurs	when	we	correctly	diagnose	the	dissimilarity	between	ourselves	and	the	other	person	but	the	stereotypes	we	employ	are	false	or	unrepresentative	of	the	out-group.	This	pattern	is	evident	in	racist	individuals’	mindreading	practices.	The	White	Supremacist,	for	example,	is	inclined	to	use	racist	stereotypes	to	infer	the	motivations	and	perspectives	of	members	of	different	racial	categories.	False	or	unrepresentative	stereotypes	have	many	sources,	including	explicit	and	implicit	bias,	idiosyncratic	experiences	with	a	group,	poor	statistical	reasoning,	and	simply	false	beliefs	about	the	group.	However	they	arise,	employing	false	or	misleading	stereotypes	is	likely	to	generate	mistakes	in	interpreting	others’	mental	states	and	behavior.	In	summary,	sometimes	we	have	the	motivation	and	ability	to	exhaustively	review	the	available	social	information	and	attribute	mental	states	to	others	in	that	
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way,	whereas	other	times	we	take	shortcuts	because	we	lack	the	motivation	or	ability	to	do	an	exhaustive	search.	In	the	former	case,	mind	misreading	occurs	when	cognitive	load	interferes	with	the	information	search,	we	apply	the	wrong	framework	to	the	situation,	or	when	self-interest	skews	our	deliberation.	In	the	latter	case,	mind	misreading	arises	when	we	misdiagnose	the	similarity	or	dissimilarity	between	ourselves	and	the	target,	fail	to	understand	our	own	mental	states,	or	apply	false	or	inappropriate	stereotypes.			
4.	The	Limits	of	Mindreading		The	philosophical	literature	on	mindreading	primarily	focuses	on	successful	mindreading.	Although	explaining	how	we	manage	the	complex	task	of	accurately	attributing	mental	states	to	others	is	interesting	and	important	for	understanding	social	cognition,	focusing	exclusively	on	successful	mindreading	obscures	the	limits	of	our	mindreading	abilities.	With	the	distinction	between	accuracy-oriented	and	efficiency-oriented	mindreading,	we	can	see	that	conditions	for	success	differ	for	each	type	of	mindreading.	Deliberative	and	efficient	mindreading	go	awry	in	distinctive	ways.	See	Table	3	below.		Table	3:	Types	of	mindreading	errors	for	accuracy-oriented	and	efficiency-oriented	mindreading.			
Mindreading	Aim	 Types	of	Mind	Misreading	
	Accuracy	 Cognitive	load	interferes	with	information	search	 Apply	the	wrong	model	 Self-interest	biases	information	search	Efficiency	 Misdiagnose	 Correctly	diagnose	 Employ	baseless,	
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similarity	between	oneself	and	other	 similarity,	but	incorrectly	introspect	one’s	mental	states		
false,	or	unrepresentative	stereotype		Errors	in	mindreading	reveal	the	limits	of	mindreading	abilities	in	a	way	that	is	not	possible	when	we	focus	solely	on	successful	mindreading.	To	illustrate,	compare	what	the	data	here	indicate	with	respect	to	the	processes	posited	by	TT	and	ST.	The	evidence	suggests	that	we	successfully	use	the	deliberative	processes	posited	by	TT	and	ST	only	when	we	have	the	motivation,	time,	and	cognitive	capacity	to	engage	in	a	thorough,	deliberative	search	for	information.	When	we	attempt	to	engage	in	such	searches	when	we	lack	the	cognitive	capacity	or	have	self-interested	biases	that	skew	our	information	search,	we	are	likely	to	make	mistakes.	These	errors,	which	are	discussed	in	3.1,	are	not	predicted	by	TT	or	ST.	The	ST	predicts	the	use	of	egocentric	heuristics,	namely,	projection	and	anchoring	and	adjustment.	These	efficient	strategies	are	employed	successfully	only	when	we	correctly	diagnose	the	relevant	similarity	between	the	target	and	ourselves	and	we	understand	our	own	mental	states.	We	are	likely	to	err	when	these	conditions	do	not	hold.	The	other	efficient	strategy	–	stereotyping	–	is	not	predicted	by	either	TT	or	ST,	though	it	is	compatible	with	the	TT	if	the	stereotypes	are	part	of	the	theory.	This	efficient	strategy	is	successful	only	when	we	correctly	diagnose	the	relevant	dissimilarity	between	the	target	and	ourselves	and	the	stereotype	employed	is	accurate	and	representative	of	the	target’s	relevant	in-group.	Stereotyping	is	inaccurate	when	it	fails	to	meet	these	conditions.	
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Typically,	mind	misreading	is	more	likely	to	occur	when	the	situation	is	ambiguous,	which	social	interactions	often	are	especially	when	they	involve	people	outside	one’s	close	circle	of	family	and	friends.	In	addition,	several	general	psychological	factors	may	lead	to	mind	misreading,	e.g.,	memory	failure,	psychosocial	disorder,	or	low	intelligence.	The	errors	I	discuss	above	arise	specifically	when	(1)	we	are	too	cognitively	taxed	to	engage	in	thorough	information	search,	(2)	we	pay	attention	to	superficial	cues,	(3)	we	are	biased	by	self-interest,	(4)	we	fail	to	understand	our	own	mental	states,	(5)	and	we	inappropriately	deploy	stereotypes.		Investigating	these	limits	of	our	mindreading	abilities	paves	the	way	for	different	perspectives	on	mindreading.	An	interesting	upshot	of	this	discussion	is	that	we	are	likely	to	make	mindreading	errors	when	we	are	not	self-aware	or	self-reflective.	Self-awareness	is	a	psychological	state	in	which	one	takes	oneself	as	the	subject,	specifically,	one’s	traits,	mental	states,	feelings,	and	behavior.	Being	self-aware	involves	reflecting	on	mental,	physical,	behavioral,	and	relational	facts	about	oneself.	One	might	have	thought	that	the	limitations	on	mindreading	would	have	to	do	with	others’	behavior	and	mental	states,	i.e.,	that	we	would	be	unable	to	make	sense	of	some	behaviors	in	some	contexts.	Though	that	certainly	happens,	this	investigation	suggests	that	the	more	immediate	limitations	on	mindreading	are	internal	to	the	mindreader.		The	idea	suggested	by	examination	of	the	limits	of	mindreading	is	that	self-awareness	predicts	mindreading	success.	Ceteris	paribus,	an	individual	who	is	less	self-aware	will	make	more	mindreading	mistakes	than	an	individual	who	is	more	
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self-aware.6	In	circumstances	where	individuals	are	less	self-aware,	they	are	more	likely	to	make	mindreading	errors.	For	deliberative,	accuracy-oriented	mindreading,	individuals	who	are	less	self-aware	are	less	likely	to	notice	that	they	are	under	cognitive	load,	that	they	are	being	overly	confident,	that	despite	trying	to	deliberate	carefully	they	are	paying	attention	to	merely	superficial	cues,	and	they	likely	will	not	notice	how	their	own	motivations	skew	the	information	search.	Individuals	who	are	less	self-aware	are	likely	to	make	mistakes	in	efficient	mindreading,	as	well.	They	are	less	likely	to	consider	how	much	or	little	they	resemble	another	person,	appropriately	adjust	their	projections	of	their	own	mental	states,	correctly	introspect	their	own	mental	states,	and	examine	their	stereotypes.	The	central	lesson	here	is	that	examining	mind	misreading	sheds	light	on	the	limits	of	our	mindreading	abilities	and	suggests	new	perspectives	on	how	mindreading	works.	Studying	the	ways	in	which	we	err	in	mindreading	will	give	us	a	better	picture	of	how	we	understand	–	and	sometimes	misunderstand	–	other	people.	I	proposed	a	hypothesis	about	the	role	of	self-awareness	in	mindreading.	This	hypothesis	is	not	end	of	the	debate.	In	fact,	it	is	just	the	start.	Investigating	mind	misreading	opens	up	a	host	of	new	debates,	which	promise	to	advance	our	understanding	of	mindreading.																																																										6	Self-awareness	does	not	uniquely	predict	mindreading	success.	Executive	function	will	play	an	extremely	important	role	in	self-awareness	insofar	as	it	regulates	attention,	inhibitory	control,	and	working	memory.	Moreover,	higher	intelligence	and	healthy	psychological	functioning	(e.g.,	conscientiousness,	tolerance,	openness)	are	positively	related	to	accurate	mindreading	(Hall	et	al.,	2009).	And	certainly	one’s	relation	to	the	target	and	motivation	to	understand	the	target’s	mental	states	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	accuracy	of	one’s	mindreading	judgments.		
	 24	
5.	Implications	of	Mind	Misreading		The	discussion	so	far	clearly	is	relevant	to	the	field	of	social	cognition,	but	it	also	has	implications	for	social	epistemology.	In	particular,	mind	misreading	bears	on	how	we	judge	whether	others	are	our	epistemic	peers.	You	and	I	are	epistemic	peers	with	respect	to	some	topic	to	the	extent	that	we	are	comparably	knowledgeable	and	competent	to	reason	about	that	topic.	That	is,	we	possess	the	same	evidence	about	X	and	are	equally	intelligent,	free	from	bias,	competent	at	perceiving,	reasoning,	etc.	(Kelly,	2010).	The	notion	of	epistemic	peer	arises	in	the	epistemology	of	peer	disagreement	debate.	Proponents	of	the	conciliation	view	argue	that	when	you	disagree	with	someone	you	take	to	be	an	epistemic	peer	you	should	reduce	your	confidence	in	your	judgment	(Christensen,	2007),	whereas	proponents	of	the	steadfast	view	argue	that	in	such	a	case	you	should	remain	steadfast	in	your	view	(Kelly,	2010).	The	notion	of	epistemic	peer	comes	up	in	the	discussion	of	epistemic	injustice,	as	well.	Epistemic	injustice,	in	particular	testimonial	epistemic	injustice,	occurs	when	a	hearer’s	prejudices	result	in	downgrading	a	speaker’s	credibility	(Fricker,	2007).	That	is,	in	virtue	of	epistemically	irrelevant	facts	about	the	speaker	the	hearer	downgrades	the	speaker’s	epistemic	status.	Central	to	both	philosophical	debates	is	the	issue	of	how	we	judge	others’	knowledge,	intelligence,	reasoning	abilities,	bias,	etc.	Our	discussion	of	mind	misreading	sheds	light	on	this	issue.	In	explaining	the	ways	mindreading	fails,	I	described	several	very	common	self-enhancing	biases:	the	Self-Serving	and	Group-Serving	Attributional	Bias,	which	
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result	in	overestimating	our	own	competence	and	underestimating	the	competence	of	others	(especially	out-group	members);	the	Dunning-Krueger	Effect,	wherein	individuals	who	are	not	knowledgeable	or	competent	with	respect	to	some	issue	egregiously	overestimate	their	own	knowledge	and	competence	and	fail	to	recognize	others’	equal	or	superior	knowledge	and	competence;	and	Naïve	Realism,	which	describes	the	tendency	to	regard	others	as	more	susceptible	to	bias	and	misperception	than	oneself	especially	in	the	context	of	disagreement.	These	three	self-enhancing	biases	influence	how	we	judge	our	own	knowledge	and	competence	in	relation	to	others.	In	addition	to	the	self-enhancing	biases,	I	also	discussed	several	biases	in	assessing	others’	knowledge	and	competence.	Social	categorization	and	implicit	associations	with	social	categories	influence	how	we	decide	who	is	an	epistemic	peer.	Simply	in	virtue	of	being	part	of	particular	social	category	we	may	upgrade	or	downgrade	a	person’s	knowledge	or	competence.	For	example,	we	tend	to	associate	spontaneously	and	implicitly	elderly	women	with	warmth	and	incompetence.	We	habitually	downgrade	the	epistemic	status	of	an	elderly	woman	just	in	virtue	of	her	social	category.	Of	course,	we	can	override	implicit	associations,	but	doing	so	requires	awareness	of	the	associations	and	their	effect	on	one’s	behavior,	attention,	and	cognitive	effort.	For	this	reason	implicit	associations	are	difficult	to	excise	from	one’s	judgments.		Furthermore,	in-group/out-group	status	significantly	affects	our	judgments	of	other	people’s	epistemic	status.	We	usually	have	more	favorable	attitudes	toward	and	empathize	more	with	in-group	members,	especially	people	who	share	our	
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gender,	race,	age,	religion,	or	nationality	than	toward	people	do	not	share	these	features.	The	data	suggest	that	we	are	less	likely	to	regard	out-group	members	as	epistemic	peers,	i.e.,	as	being	equally	knowledgeable	and	competent.	We	tend	to	simplify	and	caricature	the	mental	states	of	those	who	we	perceive	to	be	unlike	us.	Although	we	sometimes	have	positive	stereotypes	about	out-groups	–	e.g.,	an	American	stereotype	about	Asians	is	that	they	are	hardworking	and	smart	–	mostly	we	upgrade	the	status	of	our	in-group	and	downgrade	the	status	of	out-groups.	This	tendency	is	especially	strong	in	a	context	of	threat,	e.g.,	when	people	disagree	about	some	important	issue.		Combining	self-enhancing	biases	with	data	on	other-downgrading	biases	yields	a	bleak	picture	of	how	we	judge	others’	knowledge	and	competence.	It	seems	that	we	are	most	likely	to	regard	another	person	as	an	epistemic	peer	when	in	fact	she	is	an	epistemic	superior	and	she	is	part	of	our	relevant	in-group.	In	most	other	conditions,	other	things	being	equal,	we	are	likely	to	regard	an	epistemic	peer	as	inferior,	and	we	are	likely	to	regard	moderately	epistemically	superior	out-group	members	as	inferior.		These	data	suggest	that	often	we	are	not	reliable	judges	of	our	epistemic	peers.	In	particular,	we	tend	to	overestimate	our	own	knowledge	and	competence	and	underestimate	others’,	especially	others	who	are	part	of	an	out-group.	This	discussion	of	mind	misreading	has	implications	for	the	epistemology	of	peer	disagreement.	In	light	of	these	facts,	when	we	take	ourselves	to	be	in	a	disagreement	with	an	epistemic	peer	we	ought	to	conciliate.	That	is,	we	ought	to	decrease	confidence	in	our	own	judgments	when	we	disagree	with	someone	we	regard	as	an	
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epistemic	peer	because	it	is	likely	that	that	person	in	fact	is	an	epistemic	superior.7	Indeed,	when	we	take	ourselves	to	be	disagreeing	with	an	out-group	member	whom	we	regard	as	moderately	epistemically	inferior,	we	should	conciliate	then	as	well	because	our	judgments	about	the	out-group	member	are	likely	to	be	even	more	skewed	in	that	case.	The	discussion	of	mind	misreading	in	judging	epistemic	peers	is	relevant	to	epistemic	injustice,	as	well.	The	downgrading	of	epistemic	peers	and	out-group	epistemic	superiors	just	described	is	an	instance	of	epistemic	injustice,	i.e.,	of	a	hearer’s	prejudices	discounting	a	speaker’s	credibility.	Above	I	discussed	the	conditions	for	successful	mindreading	and	the	various	ways	in	which	we	fail	to	understand	others	when	these	conditions	are	not	met.	These	data	reveal	when	and	how	epistemic	injustice	is	likely	to	arise.	Social	categorization,	implicit	bias,	and	in-grouping/out-grouping	behaviors	are	particularly	important	for	understanding	when	are	likely	to	be	biased	in	assessing	others’	epistemic	status.	Understanding	when	and	how	epistemic	injustice	arises	is	an	important	step	in	mitigating	its	effects.	Mind	misreading	so	far	has	been	an	under-explored	topic	in	philosophy,	which	is	unfortunate	because	it	is	an	interesting	and	important	topic.	Mind	misreading	is	crucial	to	the	study	of	social	cognition,	and	it	has	implications	beyond	philosophy	of	mind	and	cognitive	science.	In	particular,	it	is	relevant	to	the	epistemology	of	peer	disagreement	debate	and	epistemic	injustice.	I	hope	this	paper																																																									7	The	case	of	disagreeing	experts	may	be	more	nuanced	than	the	case	of	disagreeing	non-experts.	If	one	is	an	expert	in	some	domain,	one	may	be	better	at	identifying	factors	that	distort	one’s	own	judgments	in	that	domain,	have	a	more	realistic	assessment	of	one’s	knowledge	and	competence	in	that	domain,	and	be	better	able	to	identify	others’	expertise.	Even	experts	are	not	immune	to	many	of	the	cognitive	biases	discussed	in	Section	3,	but	they	may	be	better	able	to	mitigate	their	effects.	
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shows	just	how	much	there	is	to	be	gained	in	philosophy	of	mind	and	epistemology	from	a	systematic	evaluation	of	the	ways	in	which	we	understand	and	often	fail	to	understand	other	people.8	
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